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After being an academic trend reaching into a real fashion, in the last couple of 
decades essays or studies entitled “A Social History of” have become rare, if not 
inappropriate. With the decline of social history as the overarching paradigm in 
historiography, the subgenre sounded pretentious and outmoded, risking the reader a 
deceptive experience. Ellen Meiksins Wood´s endeavour may accordingly be 
approached with a degree of initial diffidence; but even an insensitive reader should at 
least acknowledge the boldness involved in offering a social history of something as 
ambitious and encompassing as “Western political thought”. This two-volume social 
history of political thought is not, in any case, written against the current academic 
trends; quite on the contrary, it shows from its start to be well familiarized with the 
ongoing “post-classical” intellectual history influenced by the linguistic turn, as 
practiced by the Cambridge School.  
Ellen Wood shows the extent to which Marxist intellectual history has 
successfully made its own settlement with the kind of intellectual history practised in 
the 1950s and 1960s following Leo Strauss assumption, which presented “the `greats´ as 
pure minds floating free above the political fry” (Citizens to Warriors, p. 6), dismissed 
contextualization as producing trivialization and was only interested in transhistorical 
questions and answers. Yet this does not mean that we are in front of just another 
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research on ideas sensitive to context but with what appears as a challenging and 
critical approach to the recent evolutions in the field. 
Actually Wood makes her way into the realm of post-Straussian intellectual 
history by criticizing the Cambridge school usage of the concept of “context” as the 
“social and intellectual matrix” of ideas: for in practice for the followers of this line “it 
turns out that the `social´ matrix has little to do with `society´, the economy or even the 
polity. The social context is itself intellectual, or at least the `social´ is defined by, and 
only by, existing vocabularies” (p. 8). True enough, for reputed representatives of the 
Cambridge school such as Quentin Skinner or John Pocock, to contextualize a text is 
just to situate it among other texts, inside a vocabulary, and in discourses or paradigms. 
Accordingly, all the great developments and conflicts in economy or society are not 
taken into consideration. By contrast, Wood´s social history of political theory “starts 
from the premise that great political thinkers of the past were passionately engaged in 
the issues of their time and space” (p. 11). Political thinkers did not stick themselves to 
engaging in traditions or vocabularies “but also in the context of the social and political 
processes that shaped their immediate world”, often in the form of partisan adherence 
to a political cause, to the extent that sometimes their works were “fairly transparent 
expressions of particular interests, the interests of a particular party or class” (p. 12).  
 Wood´s argument is not, however, a restatement of the typical base-
superstructure dichotomic hierarchy of the Marxist tradition, but rather an argument 
in favour of radical historical contextuality: in her view, assessing the partisanship of 
authors “is certainly not to say that a theorist´s ideas can be predicted or `read off´ from 
his or her social position or class” but a chance of underwriting that the questions 
answered by great political philosophers are posed to them in specific historical forms: 
not only, as for the followers of the Cambridge school, “by explicit political 
controversies” but also “by the social pressures and tensions that shape human 
interactions outside the political arena and beyond the world of texts”.  
As already mentioned, Ellen Wood is a conscious practitioner of historical 
materialism, and so reflects on the past from the premise that there are given property 
relations that set the conditions of production and reproduction, the knowledge of 
which is essential for understanding the establishment of political domination and the 
outbreak of social struggles and other forms of resistance. Her social history of political 
thought is actually founded on an understanding of long term developments in social 
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relations, property forms and processes of state formation that episodically erupt into 
political-ideological controversies. The various patterns of property relations and state 
developments are regarded as producing different patterns of theoretical interrogation 
which ultimately shape the traditions of thought isolated by intellectual historians. 
Ellen Wood is however also a reputed historian actively involved in debates on 
the character of society and political relations in the Ancient world. In this sense her 
Peasant-Citizen and Slave offers probably the most radical alternative to the “mode of 
production” Marxist orthodoxy that regards personal slavery as the precondition of 
ancient political self-government and democracy. Against the tide of an appealing to 
common sense —but logically simplistic and chronologically inaccurate— literature 
that derives classical freedom from the private control of manpower and the 
emancipation by (male) household owners, Wood offers an explanation for the 
semantics of eleutheria —defined as “freedom from the necessity to work for another” 
either individually or collectively (p. 19)— embedded in a culture of economic self-
sufficiency and political autonomy developed by ancient Greek peasants and craftsmen 
through a long process of successful breakage with the predominance of personal 
bonds, a singular outcome given that elsewhere in precapitalist societies direct 
producers tended to be politically subjugated to landed aristocracies, military groups 
and/or hierocracies. Part of the first volume of this social history is devoted to 
describing the effects of such collective emancipation both in the creation of the polis 
—which instituted inclusive citizenship instead of the usual ruler-ruled cleavage— and 
in the rise of a political culture centered around legal disputation and argumentation 
for collective deliberation. Wood´s perspective goes here beyond Marx and Weber and 
regards the Greek city-state not just as a political system but “a unique organization of 
social relations” (p. 18) in which producers —other than slaves, who were on the other 
hand initially reduced to the performance of domestic activities— were not forced to 
transfer economic surplus to ruling classes, a structural feature that deeply reshaped 
the contours and contents of political society. 
Such a singular social fabric eventually resulted in a democracy that far 
exceeded modern versions of self-government by citizens, and included regular 
participation in assemblies and popular juries. From the perspective of conceptual 
history, it is noticeable how, in describing the historical specificity of Ancient Greek 
culture, the author outlines the semantics of basic concepts such as isonomia —
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equality of law— or isegoria —equality of speech, “the most distinctive idea to come 
out of democracy” (p. 39 )— ; more relevant for conceptual historians is Wood´s 
argument on the embeddedness of conceptual contestability, which she relates to the 
endurance of traditional definitions in the face of institutional and cultural changes, as 
in the case of diké —justice conceived as natural decorum vs. standard of correct 
behaviour subject to collective judgement— or nomos —law conceived as essential, 
unwritten rules from the customary in kinship vs. the formal rules of the new political 
order—; conceptual contestability in its turn arose in the context epistemological 
debates on whether institution were natural or the man-made, objective or 
conventional. 
Wood´s thesis is that it was out of the embedded disputability of these concepts 
that political theorization was actually born. The rise of disputation leading to 
abstraction and generalization was however part of a wider historical process marked 
by the struggles for curtailing the collective capacity of the poor —being the most 
widespread social category in ancient city-states— vis-à-vis the power of entrenched 
oligarchies. What makes of the first volume of this social history a thoughtful essay is 
that Wood offers an originally sound explanation as to why the great founding fathers 
of philosophy —from Socrates to Aristotle and beyond, but especially Plato— were so 
blatantly anti-democratic. On this issue —subject to recurrent reflection in modern 
literature— she neglects the long-term tradition of downplaying the moral standards of 
the demotic phase in the city-states, and rather presents Plato as an active militant in 
favour of aristocratic political solutions who deployed his arguments as a means of 
displacing the authority of common citizens as thinkers. She does so by interpreting 
Plato´s work as framed in a language of household economy and popular practical 
wisdom which he could use for his own purposes —though neither circumvent it nor 
overpass it— by reorienting the ethics of craftsmanship —revolving around the 
concept of tejné, which encompassed a mixture of the modern semantics of arts and 
technology— against democracy. Through an elegant contrast with Protagoras´ pro-
democratic discourse, Plato is thus portrayed as “appealing to the familiar experience 
and values of the labouring citizen” and “constructing his definition of political virtue 
and justice on the analogy of the practical arts” (p. 63), but for the sake of excluding the 
producer from politics. 
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The relevance of Wood´s definition of context can be seen at work here when 
she underlines that Protagoras and Plato drew their arguments from the democratic 
experience of Athens: both placed “the practical arts of the labouring citizen at the 
heart of their political arguments, though to antithetical purposes” (p. 64). This frame 
of interpretation allows her also to vindicate pre-Socratic sophists as the real inventors 
of political thinking by means of their adversarial argumentation based on judicial 
empowerment and education of the commoners, and their emphasis on nomos or 
convention against physis; and praises their discourse as a kind of practical 
universalism which, against the convention after Socrates, was not relativist but rather 
motivated by the conviction that virtue is a universal capacity.  
Wood´s analysis also allows for an assessment of the contribution by Aristotle 
that stresses even more the degree to which “historical contexts and political 
commitments present themselves not as ready-made answers but as complex 
questions” (p. 83), so that the thinker´s solutions were unpredictable and can only be 
illuminated ex post by shedding light on those contextual questions: Aristotle, 
although favouring aristocratic solutions for the city-state and regarding order and 
inequality as natural, was well aware of the conflictive nature of a self-governed 
political system based on the collective participation of the many —which embedded 
the tension between equality and inequality—, and so devoted his work to study 
political cycles and the devising of constitutional combinations that secured the 
incorporation of the demos and the recognition of the labouring poor as political 
agents, albeit subordinated to the prevalence of natural aristocracies. 
With the historical sequence started by Socrates and his emphasis on the 
autonomy of moral education, and following up to Aristotle and his naturalization of 
political order, popular apprenticeship was ultimately degraded in favour of 
scholarship, and knowledge became strongly identified with unveiling the hierarchy of 
the general over the particular. Wood does not linger on the suppression of historical 
alternatives this process entailed but rather focuses on its resulting effect: the birth of 
what she takes as “one very particular mode of political thinking” that, after emerging 
in the very particular historical conditions of ancient Greece, “developed over two 
millennia in what we now call Europe and its colonial supports” (p. 1). That particular 
mode is defined as theory, meaning the systematic analytical interrogation of political 
principles, which involved definitions, counterarguments, adversarial discourse and 
SÁNCHEZ LEÓN 
252 
 
other rhetorical techniques that presuppose the application of critical reason to the 
issue of “what constitutes the right and proper ordering of society and government”. 
This social history is then not of political thought widely speaking, but rather of 
“political thinking” as a historical product, and of the conditions that have made of 
political theory a tradition. 
This latter question, according to Wood, owes much to the Roman experience 
as a city-state eventually expanding into a fully-fledged empire, a process that curtailed 
from early-on the evolution towards democracy, though anyway embedding in the 
political system the tension between the wealthy landowner aristocracy and the 
subordinated classes. In a context where —more so after the defeat of the struggles for 
land reform— the patricians of the Italic peninsula were never challenged to the degree 
of their earlier counterparts from the Peloponnese, the heritage of Greek political 
thinking was received and refined, only to be partially reoriented in order to adapt it to 
the requirements of a singular political community in which property was the main 
resource for political agency and where a “hierarchical citizenship” —founded on the 
premise of a massive slavery by conquest and trade— was constantly recreated together 
with military expansion. 
In the wider picture, the Roman contribution to a history of political thinking 
was not so impressive. Following the trend towards “the introversion of the active 
citizen” (p. 105) developed in the Hellenistic period, the political culture of the 
Republic was much shaped by issues relating to ethics and the accommodation of 
inequality into the political system; thus, authors like Cicero embodied more a 
synthesis of old topics from classical Greece oriented towards the pursuit of order and 
the morals of public service. Wood is anyway able to present Cicero´s work as both 
framed in the inherited language of popular citizenship and moved by his perception of 
the decline of republican aristocracy, and so able to “combine what appear to be 
democratic principles of aristocratic equality with an aristocratic notion of 
“proportionate” equality” (p. 142). Other authors like Polybius would on their turn 
draw from Aristotle in order to distil the ideal of the mixed constitution, which 
functioned as the backbone from where political theory would continue to flourish for 
centuries onwards.  
Even if the political thought of the Roman Empire remained haunted by the 
weight of Greek philosophy, it was to bring about a crucial epistemological, theoretical 
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and juridical distinction for the future of a tradition of political thinking: that between 
private and public, contextually referred to by the semantic fields of dominium and 
imperium. This path-breaking cleavage actually hid the overwhelming centrality of 
property in the Roman world: as opposed to the Greeks, who had no clear conception 
of it, property shaped not just the political life and juridical production of Rome but its 
whole “cultural formation” (p. 120). This is certainly not an original reflection; however, 
aside from tracing it to the structure of social relations of exploitation, Wood draws 
from it a conclusion that functions as the underlying thesis in the rest of this social 
history: that the social and cultural experience of classical times embedded the relative 
autonomy of political systems from property relations. In other words, property and 
state separated from Antiquity onwards, so that the tension between appropriators and 
producers has never since been synonymous with that between rulers and subjects.  
It should already be clear that Ellen Wood´s social history is far away from the 
flat and simplistic cliché with which academic historians usually dispense of self-
assumed practitioners of historical materialism. Wood not only offers a perspective 
detached from base/superstructure assumptions but even challenges usual “history-
from-above” accounts: as she summarizes, “[t]he democratic polis represented a case 
perhaps unique in pre-capitalist history in which a propertied class for various historic 
reasons had neither the military nor the political predominance required to sustain its 
property and powers of appropriation” (p. 194). This is all the more interesting, not just 
given Wood´s affiliation with the Marxist tradition, but because many intellectual 
historians of today are much more deterministic when accounting for the supply of 
language, discourse and meaning in the historical contexts they study.  
For the purposes of this review, the relative autonomy of the economic was to 
have radical effects on the production of theory over the long-term: as appropriators 
and producers started confronting each other “not primarily as rulers and subjects”, “an 
unprecedented juxtaposition of, and new tensions between, economic inequality and 
civic equality” were created and became eventually embedded, reaching a degree of 
complexity that made of political thinking a social need. This was the legacy that the 
Middle Ages received from Antiquity, and that was to be prolonged and extended, 
though in a different context in which Christianity introduced its own issues, starting 
with a tension between the spiritual and temporal dimensions of power, while trying to 
keep the distinction between imperium and dominium inherited from Latin Antiquity. 
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In this sense, Wood´s social history of political thought does not regard the end of the 
Roman Empire as a historical cleavage but as an experience of “transformation” in 
which certain social and intellectual trends even more clearly did actually stand out. 
This was so due to the centrality of feudalism, a kind of social order in which producers 
did not face property owners as a collective entity backed by the state but in a rather 
more directly personal relation, as individual landowners in rivalry with other owners 
or the state. In a world like this, “economic relations of appropriation were inextricably 
bound up with political relations” (p. 167), but as sovereignty fragmented itself and 
power had to be exercised by lords and their military retinues there took hold a 
“politically constituted” type of property, which presupposed the heritage of Roman 
property. Again, this might be a conventional way of qualifying the Middle Ages, but 
Wood goes on to discern that, compared to previous empires in history, fragmentation 
coincided here with an unprecedented strengthening of property, and this gave the 
medieval nobility of the West a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the monarchy that was 
crucial for understanding the dynamics of political theorizing in the coming centuries. 
According to these conditions, the dominant discourse in the medieval period 
was to stem out of the need to negotiate jurisdictions in theory and practice. Such 
orientation was a response not just to further complexity in the relations between 
imperium and dominium, but to the fact that both the political and the economic 
dimensions were becoming more difficult to isolate at the juridical or the analytical 
levels: as the line between property and possession could not be so easily drawn, the 
distinction between public power and property was also blurring. Yet here we are not 
offered a story of rupture with the past: Wood´s argument is that during the Middle 
Ages the outlining of new and radical conceptions of property —i.e. as common or 
natural— ultimately referred to the inherited resources from Roman private law. 
Departures from tradition were certainly more marked at the discursive level, for this 
complex polity suited better disputation through canon and civil law rather than by 
philosophical works. In a world that so starkly instituted juridical inequality, the issue 
of social relations as classes ceased to be the central subject of political discourse, 
which instead “revolved around the nature and location of rule itself, together with 
relations among the various and overlapping claims to rule” (p. 195).  
In all, this was both a reflection and a factor of the thorough transformation in 
the contents of civic identity. “The constitutive social relations of feudalism precluded 
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the kind of civic accommodation that underlay the ancient polis and political theory” 
(p. 195), declares Wood, while offering an interesting comparison between the 
medieval Western and ancient Greek notions of active citizenship (pp. 194-195). In a 
world presided by privilege, the principal subject of political philosophy could not 
anymore be “the civic life of citizens in a self-governing community” (p. 199). This is not 
to deny that sometimes the civic commune might assert itself against lordly rule, as in 
the case of the Italian city-states, but even there the core of reflection was initially on 
authority and jurisdiction in the absence of a clearly defined political sphere.  
In this interpretation there is space for accounting for semantic and intellectual 
innovation: drawing on Janet Coleman, Wood refers to the transformation of the quod 
omnes tangit formula, now assuming a deliberative body consenting the laws —a 
possibility that was not explored in Antiquity (p. 193)—. The interpretation is used as 
a means to defend that —even after the reception of the classical tradition of the mixed 
constitution— medieval political thought was not the precursor of modern 
republicanism. By revisiting the works by Aquinas, John of Paris, Marsilius of Padua 
and William of Ockham, Wood synthesizes the innovations produced from within a 
conceptual frame that gave “overwhelming importance [to] law in general” (p. 210): the 
exercise of rule in accordance to the common good, the relevance of consent and 
representation and the share of collective subjects in sovereignty, but also the right to 
disobedience and a notion of justice more concerned with legal coherence than social 
egalitarianism. Following the scheme devised for the study of classical Antiquity, the 
argument is presented not as a general trend but adopting different shapes and 
dynamics in the various regions and principalities depending on the relations of the 
nobility and their princes between themselves and with other social constituencies 
which, in the case of urban communes, were to be even more specific and complex. In 
this sense, Wood´s account of medieval history stands out among political historians in 
stressing the singularity and diversity of historical processes, not only in time but also 
in space.  
This inception is followed more systematically in the second volume of this 
social history of Western political thought. Having stated that, already by the Middle 
Ages Western Europe had established and defined property “as a distinct locus of 
power” with “an unusual degree of autonomy from the state” (Liberty and Property, p. 
3) compared to other traditional cultures —like the Chinese—, Wood devotes another 
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study to the kind of political thinking set forth from the 14th-century onwards, “as 
revenues from peasants became more precarious and the competition with landlords 
for access to peasant labour became more intense” (p. 7). With the rise of more 
centralized monarchies, the conditions of subjection and domination changed —as 
would eventually those of economic exploitation in a particular area in the West—.  
If in the first volume Wood draws on debates on the dominant social relations 
in classical Greece, in the second she profits from the contributions but what can still 
today be deemed as the best-quality Marxist explanation and analysis of the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism. The to-date insuperable works by Robert Brenner are 
here the leading thesis which pave the way for Wood´s interpretation of the “different 
paths of state formation” in Europe. It is out of Brenner´s overall interpretation of the 
diverging paths followed by England and France that Wood is able to dispute Quentin 
Skinner´s assumption that there was something like a clear-cut and generalized 
distinction in the early modern period between the power of the ruler and the power of 
the state, which is conventionally considered the precondition for conceptualizing the 
state in modern terms.  
Wood´s contention is that England came out of the Middle Ages with a “more 
or less unified ruling class” and a rather high degree of cooperation between landlords 
and kings which fostered a “division of labour between the central state and private 
property” (p. 10-11). Although the nobles lacked coercive power over tenants, they 
controlled the state through parliament and so were able to acquire the best lands and 
organize production through “purely economic exploitation”. This process, which 
eventually established “an economy uniquely driven by compulsions of competitive 
production, increasing labour productivity, profit-maximization and constant capital 
accumulation” (p. 8) —namely, agrarian capitalism— made England markedly 
distinctive from its continental counterparts in that extra-economic coercion or 
politically constituted forms of private property made out of privilege, seigneurial 
rights and jurisdiction where not anymore at the core of its functioning and 
reproduction. Conversely, in France the initial parcellization of sovereignty was 
eventually overcome by monarchical centralization but at the cost of transferring to 
peasants and urban producers the juridical conditions for their economic survival, 
which left the monarchy the only option of building up a centralized tax system that 
eventually uprooted the nobility of land control but also kept the whole structure of 
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overlapping jurisdictions untouched. The monarchy strove for centralization, but “the 
dominant class continued to depend to a great extent on politically constituted 
property […] deriving from political, military and judicial powers” —usually in the form 
of office-holding— which reproduced “extra-economic status and privilege” (p. 14). 
Thus, even as centralization fostered commercial activities, France witnessed the rise of 
a prominent bourgeoisie but not the dominance of capitalist social relations. 
Once again, what matters from this historical materialist account of two 
diverging paths is that the great differences between the two countries were in the 
nature of their states “and the forms of `discourse´ they engendered” (p. 9). But Wood 
takes the issue even further. These diverging early modern trends are illustrative of a 
wider phenomenon: that “there was not just one overarching historical trajectory but 
several `transitions´ in the Western European passage to `modernity´ which have 
shaped divergent traditions of political thought” (p. 27). Accordingly, political 
philosophy in the early modern period was shaped not always in the context of modern 
state formation but “in very different, and not conspicuously modern, social and 
political forms” such as city-states, empires and kingdoms with very distinctive 
structural features. Wood suggests that a different, prospective approach should be 
adopted which does not assume the teleology of modernity: the title of the introductory 
chapter of this second volume is actually “Transitions”, in plural, and without adding 
“...to modernity”. 
With this framework in mind the book tries to show that “[t]he inherited 
languages of western political theory have been remarkably flexible in their adaptation 
to varying contextual circumstances” to the extent that not only “each specific 
historical form has posed its own distinctive problems” but also that “the same 
traditions of discourse have been mobilized not only to give different answers but in 
response to different questions” (p. 4). In practice, the perspective performs differently 
depending on the strategy deployed for accounting for the various cases under 
consideration and the choice of authors from each case, which span from the Italian 
Humanists to the French Enlightenment classics like Montesquieu and Rousseau 
through the Neo-Scholastic figures School of Salamanca from the Habsburg Hispanic 
Empire, the leading theologians of the Reform and the Dutch moral philosophers like 
Grotius and Spinoza, and last but not least the main intellectuals writing in the context 
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of the English Revolution and its sequels, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and even up to 
David Hume and Adam Ferguson. 
In a general way Wood´s stance is to underline the continuity and endurance of 
the pre-modern and its effects over the limits of semantic transformation albeit 
discursive innovations. This is much the case when dealing with Italian Humanists, 
who are presented as embodying the continuity between medieval and early power 
relations and structural features in Italian city-states. Wood states that the greater 
changes in political discourse between authors from the 13th and the 16th century “have 
to do with their differing relations to the social conflicts of their day” (p. 38) rather 
than with a significant transformation in the language of politics. This is not to deny 
that between the times of Marsilius of Padua and those of Machiavelli there had not 
occurred important changes in the composition of urban political systems and that 
contextual orientations in political thought greatly differed, but both authors wrote 
from the same language “deeply rooted in the Italian city-state”, which was more an 
inheritance from the medieval world than a precursor of a modern state: Machiavelli´s 
idea of the state –lo stato- was indeed rooted in the very corporate body of the medieval 
world, and from that point of view cannot be equated with the modern concept of the 
state as a impersonal and legal political order but rather with traditional dominium.  
Urban Italy reproduced forms of parceled sovereignty, the organization of 
which favored oligarchic control of institutions and commercial activities that did not 
mark a significant departure from feudal economic patterns: economic competition was 
framed in political rivalry, and even gild organization followed corporate principles of 
protecting the interests of their members. As Wood reminds, when the artisans from 
then popolo minuto were able to take power —as in the Ciompi rebellions of late 14th 
century— what they strived for was privileges for accessing the political domain 
otherwise monopolized by the families of the popolo grasso. There took place changes 
in this overall setting, though, and so whereas for Marsilius the ideal of a single unitary 
jurisdiction overcoming the fragmentation of sovereignty was a moving leit-motiv, by 
the time of Machiavelli what was at stake was the very survival of the urban commune 
as an independent entity in the face of the rising monarchical states.  
This latter situation fostered Humanists to reflect on military power in tension 
with traditional perceptions of virtue. Reflection on this view allows Wood to take 
position in debates on the so-called “Civic Humanist” political culture nurtured in 
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Italian urban communes, which she does to begin with by reminding the preference for 
topics and issues from Roman —and not Greek— Antiquity, with its stress on the 
moral dimension of citizenship but also its obsession with militaristic concerns, which 
were not on the contrary a core feature of Athenian democracy. Since their very 
beginning urban communes had to rely on armed force, and not only to control their 
hinterland but because conflicts between rich and poor had “the character of power 
struggles always on the verge of violence” (p. 43). From this tradition, Machiavelli´s 
preference for republican liberty stemmed out from his conviction that it produced 
better armies, since soldiers were given part in political organization and that assured 
their loyalty to both their military leaders and the urban institutions of self-
government. The urban militia model thus envisaged was, however, to be overcome by 
the new monarchic machineries staffed with mercenary troops: as Wood concludes, “it 
is then his commitment to a practically defunct political form that produced what 
many commentators have interpreted as Machiavelli´s most `modern´ political ideas” 
(p. 53). On the other hand, however, his advocacy for a Roman middle way between 
aristocracy and democracy was an alternative to reflection in the tradition of a mixed 
constitution and the cyclical transitions between forms of government in favor a more 
subtle understanding of the functional effects of frictions between rich and poor for 
guaranteeing peace and good government. As a whole, however, it was rather the 
survival of the state against external military threats what motivated Machiavelli´s 
theoretical innovations, which Wood —by means of an apt comparison with the 
classical work by Sun Tzu (p. 51)— summarizes as the adaption of traditional 
reflection on military strategy to the realm of politics. 
In other cases reflections are not so insightful, and the account risks reiteration 
and flatness. When dealing with political thinking in the Dutch Republic, Wood seems 
to be more enthusiastic about stressing the degree to which entrepreneurial Holland 
was still a “politically constituted commercial society” (p. 119) than to single out the 
specificity of Dutch political culture in the early modern period, which she reduces to 
an amalgam of civic traditions over-determined by the centrality of merchant´s 
corporate interests as embodied in the East India Company. True enough, her 
interpretation of Hugo Grotius´s reliance on his own expertise as spokesman of the 
stadtholder regime in the early 17th century —where issues of religious tolerance, limits 
to political authority and international commercial gain intertwined— helps 
SÁNCHEZ LEÓN 
260 
 
understand the context in which he built on the inherited notions of natural rights and 
produced a new understanding that left aside theological considerations. But Wood is 
reluctant to concede that this entailed a thorough transformation into a modern 
definition of individual rights but rather a conception still framed in collective interest 
and agency, behind which laid “an ideology well suited for `extra-economic´ strategies 
for establishing commercial supremacy” (p. 121). Grotius appears then not as 
innovating so much in notions of property but of jurisdiction — including the 
legitimation of the seizing of foreign ships— yet this is less derived from a refined 
hermeneutics than predicated from the assumption that the highly commercialized 
Dutch economy was founded not on capitalist relations but on a mixture of family-
based independent production and the entrenched corporate interests of the 
commercial companies. By contrast, his account of Spinoza´s complex relation to the 
notion of “democracy” is rooted in a more refined historical semantics which isolates 
the changes of the usages of the concept in the specific Dutch political setting. This 
allows Wood to debate with recent reappraisals of Spinoza both by Marxist authors 
like Tony Negri and academic challengers like Jonathan Israel, who are criticized for 
having taken for granted the specific context in which Spinoza´s appellation to popular 
sovereignty took place. 
This social history of political thinking seems to be more open when dealing 
with original moral and philosophical questions posed by challenging processes of 
cultural change, such as the Protestant Reformation. Wood´s assessment of Luther and 
Calvin´s theological and political argumentations focuses on probing that “the scale and 
consequences of the break had less to do with the originality and revolutionary import 
or intent of Luther´s ideas than with the geopolitical and social conflicts into which 
they were drawn” (p. 59). It was the specificity of context what allowed the doctrine of 
obedience to princes be launched into its opposite direction. This was certainly 
preconditioned by Luther´s path-breaking moral and theological reflection, but it was 
the peasant rebellion in the region of Munster what ultimately allowed the attacks on 
the authority of the Church to be reoriented towards the secular authorities, by making 
use of the available theological language but presenting them as “ungodly” rulers (p. 71). 
The counter example is that the doctrine of rebellion later developed by 
monarchomachs was not drawn from these radical discourses but from assertions of 
religious power by secular authorities.  
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On the other hand, however, Wood´s social history does not seem to be so 
renovating and convincing when dealing with the type of political theorization 
developed in more generalized social and political contexts. This is the case with her 
assessment of French political thought as framed in the endurance of Ancien Règime 
and absolutism throughout the early modern period. One finds here the most 
straightforward application of the concept of “politically constituted forms of property” 
to a quite well-known historical case, the point of departure being that in France state 
development or “political accumulation” was certainly not “a mark of its strength or of 
modern `rationalization´ (p. 147): the Monarchy lived out the sales of offices and high 
levels of taxation that set limits to its legitimacy and put into motion cycles of social 
and political unrest ending up in the bargaining of social peace for privileges. From this 
overall framework Woods is right in pointing out that political-philosophical concerns 
where shaped by the tension between the private and public dimensions of agency and 
legitimacy and by the need to secure a balance between the privileged estates and 
territorial corporations with a degree of recognition in the institutional order. Profiting 
from a tradition of organic images of the body politic, French political thinkers would 
thus on one side produce a whole tradition of constitutional reflection that suited “a 
polity still organized on feudal, corporatist principles” (p. 164); and on the other, they 
would reflect after the Aristotelian tradition of political economy in order to bring to 
terms the tension between the “corporatist roots” of private interest and “an increasing 
national economy” (p. 166). However, this overall interpretation inspires a reflection of 
relevant authors, from Jean Bodin to Montesquieu and Rousseau, that insists on the 
degree to which their work reflect more the fabric of the traditional body politic and 
the limits of a clear cut distinction between public and private rather than the universal 
claim to modern constitutionalism that they have been credited for. 
Part of this problem stems out from the very choice of authors of this social 
history of political thought. Ellen Wood presents herself as a stubborn vindicator of a 
canon of authors for the historical study of western political theory. She actually 
criticizes the Cambridge School for “eschewing the very idea of a `canon´ and replacing 
it with discursive contexts that include a host of not-so-canonical writers who have in 
their various ways contributed to language “situations” (p. 19). In trying to distinguish 
canonical authors from the rest, it is argued that “[g]reat thinkers, indeed, are likely to 
be those who shed light on their historical setting by thinking at an unpredictable 
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angle from it, often as uncongenial to their friends as to their enemies” (p. 27-28). It is 
not, however, so much originality or polemic what her social history really values in 
their work but their fitting into the overall picture of social and political continuities 
and transformations. In fact the interpretation and evaluation of authors varies greatly 
depending on the way they serve the purpose of grounding the core interpretation of a 
long-term growing autonomy of the economic from the political sphere.  
The implicit assumption is that canonical authors are those capable of 
penetrating the social reality of their time and in a way that can be recovered and 
apprehended by a good hermeneutics inspired in historical materialism. But the very 
notion of context as offered by Wood becomes problematic here: it leaves out the fact 
that if certain authors have become classics it has been by means of their posterity, that 
is, by the way they have been used by other authors, in contexts different from that in 
which they lived and wrote. In fact, authors considered by Wood as “not modern” have 
entered the canon as having contributed to the philosophical foundations of modernity.  
The whole issue of time inter-contextuality is as much taken for granted as 
barely reflected on in this social history. On the other hand, Wood´s re-assertion of 
canon is not particularly revolutionary. Without an explicit theory of the formation of 
the canon as a historical process, the choice of authors ends up upholding and 
underpinning a most conventional selection of reputed figures as distilled from a 
traditional intellectual history perspective. As a matter of fact, Wood recognizes at the 
beginning of his second volume to be dealing with “major thinkers whose status in the 
canon of political thought has been accepted by convention” (p. 27). In practice, the 
combination of convention and perspective favours a focus on most reactionary figures: 
in the first volume, Plato is given much more relevance than Aristotle; in the second 
one, all those who suit better Wood´s overall interpretation of the limits to modernity 
in the early modern period.  
This selection within the canon is governed by what appears to be a rigid 
classification of a variety of pre-modern polities —certainly leading to a picture of 
politically multicultural Early Modern Western Europe— and the “modern” one. This 
interpretive and narrative strategy goes against one other methodological assumption 
of this social history of political thought which claims that, aside from a different 
understanding of context, attention is given to “apprehend historical processes” (p. 29). 
In fact, however, all those argued-for “transitions” not necessarily to modernity end up 
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as failed paths towards nowhere. This greatly originates in the outstanding status given 
to the historical trajectory of England in Western history. 
Wood final chapter on the early modern tension between liberty and property is 
devoted to the English performance. Here we find a dynamic account which on the 
other hand synthesizes the long-term overall trajectories of social evolution and 
political developments elsewhere only to produce a deeply singular and path-breaking 
settlement. After profiting from a long history of royal centralization and unification of 
the landowning nobility, England entered the early modern period having overcome the 
structure of parceled out, corporate jurisdictions that defined its continental 
counterparts: “a fundamental unity of purpose and practice between monarchy and 
landed classes as partners in a distinctively centralized state” (p. 215) there encouraged 
production of “a tradition of political thought in which individuals, without mediation 
by corporate entities, were conceived as the basic constituents of the state” (p. 216). 
This not only made for the possibility of defining the state as an impersonal entity —as 
already offered in Bishop John Ponet´s Shorte Treatise of Politike Power from 1556— 
and the polity as a single `commonwealth´ —as first coined by Sir Thomas Smith, the 
ambassador to France, in 1583— but also framed political thinking in the tradition of 
the mixed constitution, though not anymore for stressing the moderating effects of the 
intermediate bodes but rather for arguing for the balance between the different 
principles embodied by each of its constitutive parts. 
Such consensus over balance was broken by the Stuart drive towards 
absolutism in the early 17th century. As the Parliament denounced the violation of the 
composite monarchy partnership by the King, there emerged unique constitutional 
debates: in the absence of strong corporations embodying collective rights, for the first 
time there could appear a demand for the inclusion, as individuals, of those subjects not 
directly represented in Parliament but without the consent of which it was argued that 
there could not be a legitimate sovereignty. The outbreak of the Civil War eventually 
opened a period “of unique intellectual ferment” in which inherited social conditions 
“placed radical ideas on the agenda in unprecedented ways” (p. 224). It was in 
particular the creation of the New Model Army —which quickly became not just en 
effective military machine but also “a militant political force”— what urged for a 
settlement in the definition of new basic concepts such as consent, active citizenship 
and property, and for the first time there appeared a tension between the definition of 
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rights as natural or conventional. Wood reconstructs the debates between the 
Levellers, who insisted on the extension of the franchise to all Englishmen, and more 
moderate positions reducing the contours of sovereignty to those represented in 
Parliament; interestingly, the account of leading intellectual figures such as Hobbes and 
Locke is founded in their ability of “appropriating some of the most democratic ideas” 
of their time” (p. 255), if only to produce important re-orientations that would 
eventually serve as bulwarks against the actual development of a democratic political 
system while offering what appeared as universal, abstract approaches to sovereignty 
and property rights.  
One problem of this insightful and rigorous narrative stands out when Wood 
deals with its 18th-century sequels, for she traces the conceptual conditions for 
commercial society debates back to the seventeenth-century discourse settlements; and 
these are, in their turn, ultimately explained by the institutional and social 
transformations already well under way by the sixteenth century, if not before. The 
social conditions of the Scottish Enlightenment are thus presented as essentially given 
at least two hundred years before! On the other hand, in this long-term historical 
picture, the uniqueness of the West is further reduced to the exceptionality of England, 
with the problem that, if the former tends to be identified with Eurocentrism, Wood´s 
social history may then be charged of being Anglo-centric. One way of avoiding this 
risk would have been a reflection on how, even if produced and resulting from specific 
geographical contexts, ideas also travel and are rather more nomadic than born to 
remain settled down. In practice, Wood takes this into account when for example she 
traces the import of Hobbes´s ideas into the Dutch political-intellectual environment; 
but she operates this way mainly to stress the different role played by Hobbes´ ideas 
depending on context. A systematic approach to this issue of semantic transfers would 
have probably rendered a more complex casuistry, though, for what ultimately lies 
behind the building of a canon of Western political thought seems to be the relative 
convergence in patterns of interpretation of classical works, not only in time but also in 
space. 
Old intellectual history could be blamed for its commitment to transhistorical 
approaches but the alternative should avoid a reductive understanding of spatial 
contextuality. Interstate relations are a relevant feature in any social history of political 
thinking, and especially in Western Europe during the early modern period: as the wars 
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of religion gave way to the rise of competition for hegemony among kingdoms, the 
reception and adoption of concepts, discourse and ideologies became embedded in 
every culture and public sphere. In order to grasp the relevance of this empirical 
argument it is mandatory a dialogue with Reinhart Koselleck´s proposition that 
concepts are not mere reflections of institutional and social settings but also active 
factors in their transformation.  
The book closes with Wood arguing for a new understanding of modernity not 
as equated with the Enlightenment but rather with capitalism. The debate is certainly 
of interest to the extent that it contributes to make distinctions that are not always 
considered by historians and intellectuals in general, who tend to take modernity´s self-
referential ideology as an analytical tool. In this sense, Wood´s differentiation between 
an Enlightenment founded on the cultural outlooks of the bourgeoisie under pre-
capitalist social conditions, and a properly-speaking culture of capitalism, is both 
appropriate and useful. Still the problem remains: it is far from clear that capitalism 
produces one single ideology or culture of its own but rather incorporates as well 
traditions from its recent past such as the Enlightenment. The proper approach to this 
issue should stem out from a theory of which is the status of political thinking in 
society and how does it change through time. For it seems that, as a historical 
phenomenon, the Enlightenment has to do with the growth in autonomy of ideas, to 
the extent of directly influencing contextual change. From a materialist point of view, 
one means of avoiding here an idealist approach is again to discuss with the 
Koselleckian conceptual history approach. 
In all, Ellen Wood performs as a very good contextualist intellectual and 
conceptual historian, and this is not in spite of but thanks, at least partly, to her 
distilled, refined and exigent Marxism. Many of the arguments and interpretations of 
this social history should incite research as much as debating. Even if her definition of 
political theory is not as radically historical as conceptual historians would like, it is 
out of question that this approach to political thinking poses relevant questions, not 
only to the premises of the history of political thought after the linguistic turn, but also 
to the actual practice of conceptual history. In particular, this social history of political 
thought shows the relevance of the changing —and increasingly complex— concepts of 
property for any account of the longer-term semantic transformations brought about 
with the development of the early modern state and capitalist economy. In implicitly 
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pointing to a vacuum in this respect, Wood´s Marxism is actually signalling the 
conventional way by which means conceptual historians practice their professional 
activity, too much dependent on the preferences and shortcomings of historians of 
political thought.  
Even if profiting from best quality historical materialism, Wood´s history 
cannot make for a brand new paradigm; yet she makes the case for a social history of 
discourses after the linguistic turn. While dispensing of Quentin Skinner´s work as “yet 
another kind of textual history, yet another history of ideas” (p. 9), she denounces John 
Pocock´s vision of history as having “little to with social processes” and being 
interested in historical transformations “only as visible shifts in the language of 
politics” (Citizens to Lords, p. 10). It is remarkable how a practitioner of historical 
materialism is able to denounce the new intellectual history paradigm for not being 
historical enough: in criticizing their method and perspective Wood reminds that “[t]o 
historize is to humanize, and to detach ideas from their own material and practical 
setting is to lose our points of human contact with them” (p. 14). This is followed by 
the usual call of attention against the risks of presentism —“If we abstract a political 
theory from its historical context, we in effect assimilate it to our own” (p. 16)—; yet 
the argument is more radically framed in its extra-intellectual consequences: the 
relevance of a social history of political thinking is not just in that it enables “a critical 
distance from our own unexamined assumptions” (p. 80) but in that it avoids 
“emptying historical political theories of their own political meaning” (p. 15). 
In order to make of this social history a proper alternative there are however 
important methodological challenges to be faced and solved, starting with how the 
non-linguistic dimension of contexts are rendered intelligible or translated into 
language and discourse, and ultimately inserted in the works of authors. A theory of the 
ability, and the limits, of language for giving meaning to objective social and economic 
processes still remains to be built, but it would certainly contribute to a better 
understanding of the long-term separation of the economic and the political in the 
West and elsewhere.  
